Security Institute (CCSS), which manages public health clinics, and the cooperatives. The fourth section includes accounts of the data used, empirical specification, methodological issues, descriptive statistics and analytical findings. A final section concludes.
Health care provision and the principal-agent problem
Most health facilities in developing countries -particularly public hospitals -are financed through budget allocations that are not directly related to the amount and quality of health care services they provide. These facilities are under the nominal supervision of a health ministry, and gross violations of expected norms can lead to dismissal of hospital directors or staff and penalties in the form of reduced budgets or the withdrawal of certain privileges in subsequent years. But in practice, supervision is weak and penalties for poor performance are the exception.
The most commonly suggested reform is to make clinics and hospitals residual claimants on revenues, and/or to expose hospitals to competitive markets through the establishment of renewable and competitively offered contracts for specific services. The motivation for these ideas comes from classical agency theory, which holds that time-based payments for services (salaries or budgets) do not charge agents (in this case, hospitals) for on-the-job leisure (Milgrom and Roberts 1992) . As a result, the managers of public and not-for-profit organizations do not personally lose income when they hold a Friday afternoon office party, misplace a patient's file, or otherwise slack off.
The impact of separating finance from provision will depend on, among other things, how the financier pays the provider, or, in other words, the contract between the government and the facility or hospital. Optimal contracts turn out to be complex agreements that attempt to reconcile competing objectives. Most analyses of these contracts, drawing from classical agency theory, focus on the trade-off between risk and efficiency. Given that patients do not pay the marginal cost of health care in hospitals, either because they have insurance coverage or because governments offer subsidies, and that the amount and type of health care needed when a patient arrives at a hospital are unknown, either the hospital or the payer must assume financial risk. Hospitals will refuse contracts in which they are paid a flat rate to treat all presenting patients (or they will ration care or cut quality), but contracts that reimburse hospitals for all incurred costs provide no incentives to reduce unit costs and encourage hospitals to see as many patients as possible.
The optimal solution lies in the middle. Under some conditions, transferring some but not all risk to providers, some 'supply-side cost sharing' or 'partial capitation', can improve social welfare by mitigating the excess consumption from moral hazard without eviscerating the risk-pooling function of insurance, which imposing very high co-payments or user fees would do (Pope 1989; Ellis and McGuire 1990; Ellis 1998; Newhouse 1998 ).
The possibility that providers might skimp on care-giving suggests that the classical agency model is not the full story. There is more going on than the transfer of risk to providers. When agents perform multiple tasks, basing rewards on just one or two of them can distort agents' incentives, leading to perverse outcomes. Hospitals and clinics -among the most complex organizations in the modern world -undertake multiple tasks, including patient intake, emergency care, patient education, training residents and interns, epidemiological surveillance, charity and disposing of biohazards. Basing contracts on a few indicators -even fundamental ones such as patient intake, bed days provided or risk-adjusted diagnosis at entry -might compromise other objectives.
A number of theoretical models attempt to identify optimal payment methods when both efficiency and quality enter into the payer's objective function. A general conclusion is that 'mixed reimbursement systems are necessary to optimally balance cost and quality' (Dranove and Satterthwaite 2000) , but how much supply-side risk sharing is optimal depends on parameters such as beneficence, competition and the elasticity of demand for quality.
Another kind of argument for separating financing from provision emerges from accounts of public sector organization. Public bureaucracies, orderly and regimented hierarchies in the simple, stylized Weberian conception, are in reality often divided and politicized. The problem for some public managers is not that they lack discretion over their agencies, as the stylized account suggests, but that they are responsible to several principals with differing interests. One theoretical model demonstrates that if a manager can achieve the goal of one principal only at the expense of the goals of the others, a situation might result in which the principals find it optimal to reward the manager on the basis of performance criteria that subvert the goals of the other principals (Dixit 1997) .
The arguments for medical cooperatives in particular, as opposed to other kinds of corporatization or privatization, draw on the notion that health care providers are intrinsically motivated to care for patients (Newhouse 1970; Heckman et al. 1997) , and that they are more likely to provide good care, and not to skimp on it, than owners who are not physicians or nurses. Empirically, health cooperatives played an important role in the development of the health care system in Cuba (Guttmacher and Danielson 1979) , but more recently an experiment with physician cooperatives in São Paulo was abandoned after political controversy and alleged corruption undermined their legitimacy (Csillag 2001) . Also in Brazil, the health care 'cooperative' Unimed has succeeded in establishing a market in São Paulo and elsewhere, but it, unlike the Costa Rican cooperatives discussed here, does not depend on the government for most of its financing and offers insurance as well as primary care (Iriart et al. 2001 ).
History of health cooperatives in Costa Rica
The Costa Rican Social Security Institute (CCSS), established in its current form in the 1940s, was created with the objective of offering protection in all areas of health and The introduction of market-like mechanisms began with efforts in 1988 that introduced the first health care cooperatives. Each health care cooperative was founded by the employees of a primary health care clinic. They formed autonomous, legal entities that assumed responsibility for management of the facility. The facilities were leased from the CCSS to the cooperative for a yearly fee of roughly US$1, and all equipment and infrastructure was transferred to the cooperative. From this point onward, the cooperative assumed full responsibility over the maintenance of existing equipment and the purchase of new equipment (unless cooperatives could prove that damage or deterioration was due to defects in the construction or quality of materials used in the installations). The cooperatives purchased inputs, such as drugs and medical supplies, from CCSS centres, at cost plus 15% for administrative and shipping expenses, or, if necessary, directly from the market. The services provided were the same as those in public clinics, and the catchment population continued to be the population living within the geographic area served by the cooperative. The cooperatives received a yearly capitation fee based on the estimated number of members in the geographical area. Furthermore, no additional services were provided or fees charged by the cooperatives, as the aim of the new model was to maintain an identical package of services with a change in management responsibility. The cooperatives were, however, allowed to charge non-insured individuals seeking care on equal terms with the CCSS clinics. In practice, however, almost no user charges have been collected at the primary care level.
Several groups had strongly opposed the introduction of cooperatives because they suspected that it was effectively a privatization, which was seen as a renunciation by the state of its responsibility for the provision of free or low cost health services. At that time, privatization was perceived as political suicide (though in 2000, CCSS contracts with purely private clinics were established for the first time), and the creation of cooperatives, rather than privatization, was in fact a kind of compromise.
In 1988 a self-managing cooperative, COOPESALUD R.L., was awarded the administration of services and placed in charge of the management of the Pavas Clinic of the CCSS. Over time, three other traditional clinics, also in urban areas, were converted to health cooperatives. Under the framework of Law 4179, which governed cooperative associations in Costa Rica, cooperative management was selected by an administrative council, which was itself elected every 2 years by the general assembly of all cooperative members. Legally, all workers in the cooperatives became shareholders, and periodically shareholders received earnings generated by the cooperative. All workers were also partners in the sense that part of their salary was regularly deducted to augment the company's social capital. The cooperatives operated under private law, without public encumbrances related to contracting, firing and management of personal and resources. The cooperatives enjoyed income tax exemptions and considerable political support. The cooperatives had full autonomy to manage the capitated payments they received from the CCSS, but were obligated to present annual financial statements to the CCSS for external audit purposes. All profits generated by the business were either reinvested in new equipment or infrastructure, or distributed to cooperative members.
In return, the cooperatives were required to follow the guidelines and policy objectives set by the CCSS and the Ministry of Health. The contracts signed with the CCSS obliged cooperatives to provide the following services: general and specialized medicine, emergency care, minor surgery, dental care, pharmaceuticals, laboratory and radiology services, biopsies, laboratory smear tests, social work services, services related to rights and benefits verification, transportation for patients, and support services. The cooperatives were also required to evaluate their own performance; in addition, independent, external auditors appointed by the CCSS monitored the cooperatives.
The CCSS employed three different payment schemes over this period: payment per capita, then historical budgets and finally payment based on management contracts. Although prospective per capita payments (based on estimated populations in each clinic's catchment area) in theory transferred financial risk to the clinics, in reality they differed little from historical budgets; in both cases clinics were able to reduce services as expenditures approached budget ceilings. Management contracts involved more active involvement on the part of CCSS officials in the annual plans of the clinics, and the establishment of targets for production and coverage.
The most significant change in provider payments occurred only in the cooperatives, which retained all earnings and assumed all losses from their operations.
Four evaluations of cooperatives in Costa Rica have been conducted. Herrero Villalta Asociados (1992) compared costs between two cooperatives and five selected traditional CCSS clinics in 1991, and found that the variances in expenditures and treatments were higher in the traditional clinics. Their findings, though suggestive, were based on 1 year of cross-sectional data and a non-random sample. Durán et al. (1995) compared expenditures between four cooperatives and four comparator clinics from 1990-94, and found that cooperatives had higher levels of expenditures. The nonrandom selection of the comparison clinics, as well as the use of incomplete budget data, might have biased that analysis. Picado (1999) and Rodríguez (1999) both compared expenditures from 1992-98 between three cooperatives and four traditional CCSS clinics, and found higher but declining relative expenditures in the cooperatives. Again, sampling issues were problematic in these studies. The analysis in the present paper compared cooperatives with the universe of CCSS clinics at the same level of complexity, and controls for several potential community-level covariates.
Data
Data were available on all type III and type IV clinics in Costa Rica, but clinics for which data were available only for very short periods of time (2 or 3 years) were excluded, as were those that were only recently set up. 1 As a result, 23 observations were dropped, leaving the database with 24 type III and type IV clinics, three of which are cooperatives. The main source of information was the annual statistical bulletin of the CCSS. The data on infant and general population mortality were taken from specific studies by the Estado de la Nación, developed by the United Nations Development Program, and an infant mortality study by the General Department of Statistics and Census. The population data, including the demographic structure of the catchment areas, were compiled from projects carried out since the 1984 census by the Demographic Analysis sections of the Department of Actuarial and Economic Planning of the CCSS.
Methods
The main objective of the empirical analysis was to determine whether health services provided in cooperative clinics in Costa Rica differed from those provided in the traditional public clinics over the same period. To accomplish this, we first examined long-term trends and descriptive statistics, and then modelled health service performance indicators using the general form:
where Y is a vector of health service performance indicators in clinic i at time t, Coop is a binary variable indicating whether or not a clinic is a cooperative, X is a vector of clinic and community characteristics, Z is a set of annual indicator variables, and e is a randomly distributed error term. Panel data sets like this one typically encounter two problems when estimated using ordinary least squares: auto-correlation because performance indicators in adjacent years (and therefore the error terms on adjacent observations) are correlated with each other; and heteroskedasticity, or unequal variance in the errors. To address these problems, we used year dummies (the Z term above) to correct for autocorrelation and Huber-corrected standard errors to generate estimates robust to heteroskedasticity. It was not possible to use a fixed effect model to correct for heteroskedasticity because two of the three clinics were cooperatives for all years in the sample, and the third was a cooperative for seven of the 10 years; consequently, clinic fixed effects would absorb almost all of the variation in the variable of interest, Coop.
A generalized estimating equations (GEE) model without year dummies might have been more efficient than the approach adopted, but since the correlation structure of the data was unknown, it might also have yielded substantially biased estimates. The reported results are therefore based on OLS estimates with year dummies and Huber-corrected standard errors. To reiterate, in the results reported below, the key parameter of interest is the coefficient on the Coop variable.
Limitations
There are three important and related caveats regarding the findings. First, as always, it is possible that cooperative status is not what drives the relationships described below, but rather some unobserved variable with which cooperative status is correlated. In fact, being a cooperative involves a number of different characteristics related to the distribution Separating financing from provision 295
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of residual profits and internal governance: it is possible that unobserved characteristics of Costa Rican cooperatives are driving the results and not cooperative status per se. In that case, policies should focus on those characteristics, rather than on converting clinics to cooperatives. Identifying the specific traits of cooperatives that are important for driving the results requires more data regarding internal financing and governance than was available for this analysis.
Secondly, the unobserved variables driving the results might be related to the organizational culture that led some clinics to convert to cooperative status in the first place. Again, further research could identify instrumental variables for cooperative status and clarify whether cooperative status or some other underlying variable is responsible for the findings below.
Thirdly, it is possible that population differences, rather than organizational characteristics, explain the observed differences between cooperatives and traditional clinics. To mitigate this problem, the model below uses lagged mortality rates to control for the general socio-economic level of the population in the district. (It was not possible to obtain consumption or income data that corresponded to clinic catchment areas.) Of course, if individuals are crossing districts and catchment areas in significant numbers, the issue of population treated remains problematic. It is true that the Pavas clinic was established in an area of high migration, generally increasing the catchment population faster than the general population; however, the annual population adjustments corrected for the magnitude of these population changes, if not for changes in the composition of the populations.
Results
The graphs in Figure 1 show trend lines over the decade for cooperatives and traditional CCSS clinics. The figure shows that general medical visits (CMG) per capita started at the same level in cooperatives and other clinics, and declined in cooperatives but increased in traditional clinics over the course of the decade. Specialist visits (CEM) per capita also started at about the same level and declined in both cooperatives and traditional clinics. Cooperatives gradually increased their rate of emergency visits per capita over the decade to the point that they equalled those in traditional clinics. 2 Total laboratory procedures (TEL) and total medications provided (TMD) started at lower levels in cooperatives than in traditional clinics and remained lower at the end of the decade (though they did increase in the cooperatives). Real expenditures per capita exhibited significant annual fluctuations, but they both started and ended the decade lower in cooperatives than in traditional clinics. Table 2 presents the same data as Figure 1 , but in numerical form. Generally, examining time trends suggests that cooperatives provided fewer general medical visits, laboratory exams and drugs than the traditional clinics, but systematic patterns were not evident for the other variables. Table 3 shows that population mortality rates appeared somewhat higher in the areas around the cooperatives than in the CCSS clinics, and that infant mortality rates appeared comparable between the two groups. A t-test, however, found that the average annual infant and general mortality rates were statistically indistinguishable in the catchment areas of cooperatives and traditional clinics. Similarly, the demographic structure of the populations in cooperative catchment areas was broadly comparable to that in the catchment areas of the traditional clinics. 3 Table 4 presents estimation results for the determinants of visits per capita, where catchment areas are used to calculate the estimated population served for each clinic, general mortality and infant mortality (both lagged 1 year) control for the socioeconomic level of the community served, and indicator variables for the existence of a management contract and for type III clinics control for clinic characteristics. All estimations included annual indicator variables to control for average trends at the national level. Lagged infant mortality rates were negatively related to most types of service utilization, confirming the widely observed phenomenon that services are available and utilized more in communities with higher social indicators. The variable for management contract, a dummy variable indicating the existence of a formal input-and output-based contract between the CCSS and a clinic, was significant in none of the six estimations, but the coefficient on the cooperative indicator variable was significantly different from zero in three of them, at p < 0.01.
The estimations show that the cooperatives conducted an average of 9.7-33.8% more general visits (95% confidence interval), 27.9-56.6% more dental visits, and 28.9-100% fewer specialist visits. Numbers of non-medical, emergency and first-time visits per capita were not different from the traditional public clinics. These results suggest that the cooperatives substituted generalist for specialist services and offered additional dental services, but did not turn away new patients, refuse emergency cases, or substitute nurses for doctors as care providers. The findings are consistent with an interpretation in which cooperatives reduce costs by reducing specialist referrals, but in which professional norms and government oversight keep them from cutting some of the most essential services. Table 5 presents estimation results for the determinants of the number of sick days and maternal disability days authorized per visit, the number of lab exams and medications provided per visit, and real expenditures per capita. Cooperatives authorized 30.4-60.5% fewer sick days (95% confidence interval), conducted 24.7-37.2% fewer lab exams, and gave out 26.7-38.3% fewer medications per visit than the traditional public clinics. (Medications are given for free in all clinics.) Real total expenditure per capita in cooperatives, reflecting the average expenditure by the clinic to treat all health care needs of an individual member, was 14.7-58.9% lower than in traditional clinics. The number of maternity days authorized per visit did not differ between cooperatives and the traditional clinics, although the cooperatives did authorize fewer sick days.
The results suggest that cooperatives achieved cost savings by reducing the technological intensity of health care services provided. The data at hand do not permit a judgment on how many of the additional medications and lab services provided in traditional clinics were unnecessary. The data do suggest, again, that residual claimant status provided effective incentives for the cooperatives to rationalize care in ways that reduced costs.
Conclusions and policy implications
Using a panel data set on clinic-level outputs, this paper has compared the performance of health cooperatives in Costa Rica with traditional publicly managed clinics in the social security system. Controlling for catchment area characteristics, time trends, clinic complexity and active CCSS management contracts, cooperatives conducted significantly more generalist visits per capita and significantly fewer specialist visits per capita than traditional clinics. This suggests that the cooperatives responded to financial incentives by shifting to a less costly mode of health care delivery. At the same time, the per capita rate of emergency visits and first-time patients seen did not differ from that in the traditional clinics. This provides prima facie evidence that the cooperatives were not dramatically skimping on care, nor were they discouraging new patients, in order to reduce costs. Another source of efficiency was in lab tests and medications.
The cooperatives conducted about 0.4 fewer lab tests and dispatched almost one less medication per patient attended 
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Varun Gauri et al. The findings presented suggest that the cooperative model in Costa Rica is promising and deserves further exploration. More detailed analyses, based on evidence from internal evaluations, surveys of patients and patient outcome indicators should be used to assess whether cooperatives were achieving the cost-savings without compromising the quality of care provided. The prima facie evidence presented here suggests that they might be doing just that. If so, opportunities exist for the CCSS to reduce costs, or increase quality, at the margin by gradually modifying contracts with cooperatives.
The findings presented here have several policy implications for health care provision in developing countries. First, with appropriate incentives and regulatory framework, non-profit organizations in general, and cooperatives in particular, might be able to combine the advantages of public and private approaches to health care service provision. Under certain conditions, they might be able to maintain accessibility, a sense of mission and efficiency in service provision. Secondly, Costa Rica's experiment with cooperatives put in place management contracts, audits and performance evaluations to study the effects of the policy innovation. In experiments like this one, these regulations need to provide useful information for enforcement of provisions, but at the same time not be so burdensome as to compromise the autonomy of the service providers. Thirdly, conclusive findings on separating financing from provision require quality of care measures. Although the information system in Costa Rica made a study of outputs feasible, further examinations will require data on morbidity, consumer satisfaction, treatment compliance and other indicators of quality.
Endnotes
1 Type III and Type IV indicate levels of medical complexity in Costa Rican facilities. Type III and Type IV clinics include family medicine and limited specialty care such as paediatrics and obstetrics. Two of the cooperatives were Type IV and one was Type III. The facilities with which the cooperatives are compared are the universe of traditional CCSS Type III and Type IV clinics.
2 Emergency visits include emergency services provided to CCSS members either during normal working hours or by emergency services after normal working hours. These are provided in the primary care setting of the cooperative clinic.
3 Using both t-tests and F-tests, we could not reject the hypotheses that cooperatives and traditional clinics had the same infant mortality rates and the same general mortality rates. The cooperatives had a slightly lower share of children under the age of ten (20.0% versus 22.2%), a slightly higher share of women of childbearing age (23.9% versus 23.5%), and a slightly higher share of people over the age of 60 (8.5% versus 7.5%) in their catchment areas than the traditional clinics. These differences in demographic structure were all statistically significant; but since the cooperatives had more women of childbearing age and more older people, one would expect, in the absence of any organizational differences, higher health care expenditures in the cooperatives. In fact, as the analysis shows, the opposite was the case.
